Engaging GPs in commissioning: realist evaluation of the early experiences of Clinical Commissioning Groups in the English NHS. by McDermott, Imelda et al.
Original Research
Engaging GPs in commissioning:
realist evaluation of the early
experiences of Clinical Commissioning
Groups in the English NHS
Imelda McDermott1, Kath Checkland2, Anna Coleman1,
Dorota Osipovicˇ3, Christina Petsoulas3 and Neil Perkins4
Abstract
Objectives: To explore the ‘added value’ that general practitioners (GPs) bring to commissioning in the English NHS.
We describe the experience of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in the context of previous clinically led commis-
sioning policy initiatives.
Methods: Realist evaluation. We identified the programme theories underlying the claims made about GP ‘added value’
in commissioning from interviews with key informants. We tested these theories against observational data from four
case study sites to explore whether and how these claims were borne out in practice.
Results: The complexity of CCG structures means CCGs are quite different from one another with different distri-
butions of responsibilities between the various committees. This makes it difficult to compare CCGs with one another.
Greater GP involvement was important but it was not clear where and how GPs could add most value. We identified
some of the mechanisms and conditions which enable CCGs to maximize the ‘added value’ that GPs bring to
commissioning.
Conclusion: To maximize the value of clinical input, CCGs need to invest time and effort in preparing those involved,
ensuring that they systematically gather evidence about service gaps and problems from their members, and engaging
members in debate about the future shape of services.
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Introduction
In 2010, the Coalition Government proposed the
transfer of responsibility for commissioning to general
practitioners (GPs) working in consortia to be known
as Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs).1 The
rationale was that closer engagement of GPs in com-
missioning would ensure: more eﬀective dialogue
between primary and secondary care, decision making
closer to the patient, and increased eﬃciency. CCGs
were formally established in April 2013 however,
there has been little published research about CCGs
in general and the ‘added value’ clinicians bring to
the commissioning process in particular.
The ‘added value’ that clinicians bring to commis-
sioning is said to include ‘strengthened knowledge of
the needs of individuals and local communities . . .,
increased capability to lead clinical redesign and
engage other clinicians, . . ., and greater focus on
improving the quality of primary medical care as a
key part of a clinically led redesign of care systems’’.2
An ‘excellent practice’ would have constant clinical
focus on improving quality, signiﬁcant engagement
from constituent practices and involvement of the
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wider clinical community in commissioning.3 However,
it is not clear how these aspirations can be or have been
manifested in practice.
CCGs were established as statutory bodies in
England responsible for commissioning (purchasing) a
range of health services from providers. The develop-
ment of CCGs was deliberately permissive and intended
to be ‘bottom up’.1 CCGs are membership organiza-
tions, with individual general practices required to
sign up to be members. All CCGs were required to
have a governing body with statutory responsibility.
Their leadership was to be shared between an
Accountable Oﬃcer (a GP or a manager) and Chair
(clinical or non-clinical). If the Accountable Oﬃcer
was a clinician, they would need to be supported by
another senior manager. CCGs were required to have
an audit and a remuneration committee accountable to
the governing body. Most CCGs have set up an ‘oper-
ational’ body which sits underneath the governing
body, a quality committee and other groups. The per-
missive nature of CCGs’ development has created com-
plexity (Table 1) which is inherent in their internal
structure.4 This makes it diﬃcult to explore the extent
to which GPs could or should be involved.
A review of previous forms of clinically led commis-
sioning found that there is no clear deﬁnition of clinical
engagement in commissioning.5 The roles clinicians
play is dependent upon the nature of clinical engage-
ment and how much control and inﬂuence clinicians
have over commissioning decisions. A study of clinical
involvement in CCGs found that initial enthusiasm
among some GP leaders had started to wane which
was highlighted as a problem.6,7
We established a longitudinal study to explore the
development of CCGs. In the ﬁrst phase (January
2011–September 2012), we followed the development
of CCGs from inception to authorization.8 The aim
of the second phase (April 2013–March 2015) was to
explore the potential ‘added value’ that clinicians, spe-
ciﬁcally GPs, bring to commissioning.9 Using realist
evaluation, we asked:
. What value do GPs add to the commissioning pro-
cess (outcome)?
. In what ways do GPs add that value (mechanisms)?
. Under what conditions do GPs add value in the way
described above (context)?
We present our ﬁndings in the context of previous
policy initiatives in the United Kingdom to involve GPs
in commissioning, covered in a published review.5 Some
schemes (e.g. GP fundholding) provided direct incen-
tives for GPs, others provided indirect incentives in that
any savings made could be reinvested in other services
for the local population. The most direct comparison is
with Practice-based Commissioning (PBC), the imme-
diate precursor to CCGs. We used our data to identify
the mechanisms and conditions which enable GP
‘added value’ in the commissioning process.
Theoretical framework
Realist evaluation is an approach grounded in realist
tradition which focuses on the mechanics of explan-
ation, i.e., not just on whether or not a programme
works but on how and why a programme works.10 It
addresses questions about what works for whom, in
what circumstances and in what respects, and how?
The basic realist formula is: Context þ Mechanisms
¼ Outcome (known as ‘CMO triads’).
The requirement to explain why programmes work or
not implies an emphasis on the role of programme
theory which involves assumptions about how the pro-
gramme might or is supposed to work. What matters is
the way in which participants responded to the pro-
gramme. Programme theory deals with the ‘mechanisms
that intervene between the delivery of programme service
and the occurrences of outcomes of interest’.11 In realist
evaluation, the emphasis on causal explanation also
engages with the idea of mechanisms at work.
Mechanisms are ‘underlying entities, processes,
or structures which operate in particular contexts to
generate outcomes of interest’.12 Hence, mechanisms
produce outcomes and are made up of individual rea-
soning (choices) and resources available. Whether or
not mechanisms produce the outcomes expected is
dependent on combinations of its contextual conditions
which enable or constrain the mechanisms.13
Methods
Using interviews with both clinicians and managers
(n=42) in seven case study sites and a close reading of
policy documents (July 2013–January 2014), we uncov-
ered the programme theories underlying the claims made
about GP ‘added value’.9 We tested these theories
against observational data (n¼ 48 meetings; 111 hours
of observations) from four case study sites (selected
based on size, geographical area and examples of good
practice or signiﬁcant problems) to explore whether
and how the claims were borne out in practice.
Observations (January–September 2014) were recorded
in contemporaneous ﬁeld notes and interviews were
audio-recorded (with consent) and fully transcribed.
Data were stored and managed using NVivo. We
attended a wide range of CCG meetings including the
Governing Body, executive groups, membership and
informal group meetings.
Field notes and associated documents were read
repeatedly by the research team for familiarization
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and discussed at regular collaborative meetings. The
analytical process was not necessarily sequential but
data were analysed as a set of Context–Mechanism–
Outcome statements, i.e., ‘in this context those mech-
anisms enacted by that actor generated that outcome’.
The process was iterative, moving back and forth
between observational evidence from diﬀerent sites,
which lead to reﬁnement of the theories.
Results
We identiﬁed four programme theories underlying the
claims about GP ‘added value’ in commissioning:
. Theory 1: GPs’ frontline knowledge about patient
experiences would enable them to identify problems
and deal with them promptly.
. Theory 2: GPs’ frontline knowledge about services
would enable them to improve service design.
. Theory 3: GPs’ clinical experience and know-
ledge would enable them to have the authority to
speak to other clinicians in ways which improves
commissioning.
. Theory 4: GPs have a symbiotic relationship with
managers, which together is more than the sums of
its parts.
Clinical leadership and decision making
Theory 1 (GPs’ knowledge about patient experiences) and
Theory 2 (GPs’ knowledge about services). Our interviewees
suggested that GPs’ knowledge about patients and
available services would enable them to identify and
deal with problems early on and improve service
design. These theories share a common theme with all
previous clinical commissioning schemes which also
rested upon the claim that GPs are better informed
about patients’ needs than managers as they have
access to practice-level data and direct feedback from
patients.14–16
We identiﬁed some of the mechanisms by which GPs
may contribute more fully to the commissioning pro-
cess. CCGs need to ensure that there is a facilitative
environment which assures GPs that it is safe and
easy to express their concerns, and contribute to or
attend meetings. Important contributing factors
included good chairing of meetings and a willingness
to vary the meeting format to maximize the opportun-
ity for active engagement. For example, Site D decided
to use a ‘select committee enquiry’ format in one
of their meetings with hospitals to encourage GPs to
question and contribute. Good communication was
important, particularly given the complexity of CCGs’
internal structures. There needed to be proactive
communication with clinicians to ensure that they
understood which forums to address their concerns
to, which meetings were happening where, and what
topics would be covered on the agenda.
CCGs also need to actively seek out the views and
experiences of clinicians not actively involved in the
CCG on a day-to-day basis. Whilst GPs’ personal
knowledge of patients and services was valuable, it
needed to be supported with aggregated qualitative
data such as that relied upon by managers. There also
needs to be signiﬁcant preparation prior to meetings,
which includes giving GPs task-speciﬁc information
before the meeting.
Our interviewees also claimed that GPs ‘see the
whole system’. However, our observations showed
that GPs’ knowledge was often pertinent to a particular
service and they did not necessarily have insights into a
full range of services, nor about how services work in
general. Service reconﬁguration and a proliferation of
hospital providers make it diﬃcult for individuals to
understand the full range of services available locally.
Our sites recognized this, with many seeking to estab-
lish a searchable database with information on the
range of available services. Overall, clinical voices
were valuable in providing contextual details and infor-
mation as to whether services were being delivered as
intended but they required additional information from
managers in order to understand fully the pattern of
available services.
The concept of clinical leadership is central to all
models of primary care-led commissioning. Under GP
fundholding and PBC, GPs were encouraged to engage
in commissioning. GPs were the undisputed leaders in
fundholding and assumed most of the responsibility of
running the scheme including budgeting, contracting
and liaising with external stakeholders such as the
Health Authority (HA) and local providers.17
Similarly, most PBC consortia were dominated by
GPs and had a degree of delegated decision making
power.14 Under Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and
HAs, by contrast, only a select number of GPs were
engaged, either in an advisory capacity or not perceived
as inﬂuential, with GPs struggling to exert control over
decision making.18 They were used primarily as a
sounding board or source of factual information.19
Total purchasing pilots had no organizational template
so there was substantial variety in terms of the nature
of interaction between GPs and their constituent HA.20
In practice, projects that were badged as ‘commission-
ing total purchasing pilots’ had meaningful clinical
input (albeit if the input came from lead GPs) and
more autonomy and inﬂuence over decision making.21
Policy rhetoric presented CCGs as diﬀerent from
previous initiatives because GPs would take full com-
missioning responsibility.1 Our study shows that GP
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involvement in CCGs looks very similar to previous
clinically led commissioning. Most GP leaders who
are actively engaged in CCGs are the usual suspects,
who have previously held a leadership role; CCGs had
considerable diﬃculty in enthusing new GP leaders.8
However, while previous clinical involvement was lim-
ited to those in leadership positions, in CCGs this can
occur at diﬀerent levels of the organization. Some
CCGs had separate clinical and management teams
while others had a GP majority overseeing the commis-
sioning function. Some CCGs have localities, neigh-
bourhoods or a Council of Members who may or
may not be given devolved budgets and responsibility.
This makes it diﬃcult to draw general conclusions
about GP involvement as the extent to which the new
system has enabled better or more robust GP involve-
ment varies in diﬀerent CCGs.
Clinical involvement
Theory 3 (clinician-to-clinician discussions). Whilst initiatives
such as PBC had involved GPs in the commissioning
process,14 some argued their lack of statutory power
had limited their eﬀectiveness.22 Similarly, only 20% of
Primary Care Groups involved clinicians from primary
and secondary care.23 By contrast, our participants
claimed that CCGs have enabled GPs to become more
involved in contracting and made provider clinicians
more likely to engage. This suggests that GPs’ clinical
experience gives them knowledge and experience which
they can use to speak to clinicians outside the CCG in
ways which improve commissioning by, for example,
challenging existing ways of doing things. GPs’ clinical
experience gives them the authority to talk about clinical
issues and to challenge providers, if required, in a way
that managers could not. In contrast to Theories 1 and 2,
in which CCGs are seeking their members’ frontline
knowledge to be used in commissioning process,
Theory 3 is about engagement with the wider body of
clinicians who are external to the CCG.
In spite of attending many pathway development
and contracting meetings, in which hospital clinicians
were present, we did not observe many instances in
which GPs brought their clinical knowledge to bear in
challenging their hospital colleagues. In fact, one of our
study CCGs had made the decision to only send man-
agers to these meetings as it was not regarded as a good
use of GP time. We only observed one instance where
hospital clinicians’ behaviour was apparently inﬂu-
enced by the presence of GPs. In one of the quality
and performance meetings we attended, it was noted
by those present that the relevant hospital’s Medical
Director had not been attending the meeting regularly.
GPs in the group expressed their disquiet about his
absence, suggesting that they regarded it as
unacceptable, as there were a number of important
issues on the agenda such as serious safety incidents.
This challenge has led the Medical Director to attend
subsequent meetings.
The fact that we did not observe many instances
of GPs engaging with and challenging their hospital
colleagues does not mean that these conversations are
not happening. It could be that the conversations are
happening informally, outside of the formal meetings
that we observed. That we rarely observed GPs in con-
tracting meetings suggests that the claims made by
those espousing this theory – that clinicians bring a
unique and important focus to meetings with providers
– was not much experienced in practice.
We identiﬁed some of the mechanisms which under-
lie the successful attempts made by CCGs to achieving
clinician to clinician discussions. Site A had been trying
to get their members to own the CCG since they were
authorized. To achieve this, the CCG decided to invite
a hospital providing urgent care to attend the member-
ship meeting to enable GPs to challenge the hospital’s
failing performance. However, when the meeting took
place, no such challenge occurred. In contrast, in Site D
where a similar meeting was convened, GPs had a chal-
lenging discussion with the hospital staﬀ. The CCG
decided, as a trial, to organize the meeting in a ‘select
committee’ style, with GPs as committee members and
the hospital representatives as witnesses providing an
account of their services. Before the meeting, the chair
had primed some GPs in the room with questions to
ask. These GPs read out the questions when prompted
to do so by the chair, and this was followed by ques-
tions from other GPs from the ﬂoor. The panel was
then given the chance to answer. The meeting turned
out to be quite a challenging session, with the panel
becoming somewhat defensive in their answers at
times. By the end of the meeting, they identiﬁed a list
of issues to work on as a group (including hospital
clinicians, GPs and managers). Hence, careful prepar-
ation prior to the meeting and the role of the chair
enabled the GPs to have challenging discussions with
clinicians from the hospital.
Our study shows that GPs can contribute signiﬁ-
cantly to commissioning by using their clinical experi-
ence to engage eﬀectively with other clinicians but that
this requires careful preparation and management and
probably only occurs on a limited scale. To engage
eﬀectively with the wider clinical community outside
the CCG, the formal architecture of the CCG and the
operation of statutory authority were not necessary.
Some of our sites had established informal groups
across the health economy which focussed on a variety
of issues including high-level strategy and service devel-
opment ideas. These groups have no formal or statu-
tory role. The key mechanism underpinning this is that
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those present should be senior enough within their own
organization to make binding commitments on their
behalf.
Theory 4 (clinician–manager symbiosis). Our participants
claimed that GPs and managers work together more
eﬀectively than they would be able to alone. Managers
would formulate and write strategies and business plans
while GPs would assist in clinical input and engage with
other clinicians. Mechanisms which enable this theory to
work include a history of cooperation. Where this history
did not exist, careful appointment procedures in which
GPs were fully engaged could support the development
of new close working relationships. GPs and managers
should also recognize that they had diﬀerent skills and
contributions and that they felt able to challenge one
another. The status of the CCG as a membership organ-
ization was crucial and as the conﬁdence that GP mem-
bers have towards the GP–manager team working on
their behalf. The experience of success and having joint
responsibility for programme delivery was important
both in developing the close and supportive relationship
between the two individuals and in bringing the wider
membership along with the process.
This GP–manager pairing was evident under PBC.
Most consortia had some kind of managerial support
provided by the primary care trust and the extent to
which GPs truly led the agenda depended on the dynam-
ics of the relationship between assigned managers and
GPs.14 The assigned managers were facilitative and sup-
portive, acting as enablers to promote clinical leadership.
These pairings were also evident in PCTs, although in
that case, it was between the Chief Executive and
Professional Executive Committee (PEC) chair. The
PEC chair was felt to be the most inﬂuential member.24
Hence clinical leadership was limited predominantly to
one GP who held considerable power within PCTs. The
distinctive feature of some CCGs was that these clin-
ician–manager pairings were evident at multiple levels,
from the Governing Body to Localities and within diﬀer-
ent workstreams. It was clear that many of those
involved had a long history of working in a particular
locality in diﬀerent roles. A sense of a shared and endur-
ing local commitment seemed to be important in enabling
trust. However, in cases where a preexisting relationship
did not exist, having the clinicians involved in the recruit-
ment process had been important, as it enabled them to
feel that they had chosen their managers.
Discussion
Main findings
The complexity of CCG structures means they are often
diﬀerent from one another with diﬀerent distributions
of responsibilities between the various committees. This
makes it diﬃcult to be sure where responsibilities lie
within any particular CCG without detailed investiga-
tion, and diﬃcult to compare CCGs with one another.
The claims made about the value that GPs bring to
these processes were broad and idealized. There was a
consensus that greater GP involvement was important
but it was not clear where and how GPs could add most
value in the complex myriad of committees, groups and
forums existing in each CCG. It is thus diﬃcult to
determine the extent to which GPs could or should be
involved. A signiﬁcant amount of time and money is
being spent involving GPs in commissioning at a time
when general practice is under extreme pressure. It is
important that GPs’ time is utilized wisely hence, it may
be appropriate to reduce GPs’ involvement in some
forums depending on the functions of that forum.
The complexity of a CCG’s internal structure means
that diﬀerent CCGs should adopt diﬀerent approaches
to maximize their GPs’ time.
Our study supported Theories 1, 2, and 4. GPs
knowledge adds value to commissioning. However, it
needs to be contextualized and supported by proper
analytical data. GP involvement in CCGs looks similar
to previous clinically led commissioning as most GP
leaders who are actively engaged are the usual suspects.
However, there is some evidence that active GP engage-
ment runs more deeply within CCGs than it did in
previous clinical commissioning initiatives, with GPs
involved in a range of locality-based groups. This
makes it diﬃcult to tease out the extent and impact of
such involvement. We also observed close and eﬀective
GP–manager relationships, which enabled GPs’ time to
be better utilized. We did not ﬁnd many instances of
Theory 3, with little evidence of regular or routine
engagement of GPs with their secondary care col-
leagues. When clinician-to-clinician discussions did
happen, we found some evidence that such discussions
are valuable in the way the theory described.
The mechanisms and conditions which enable CCGs
to maximize the ‘added value’ that GPs bring to the
commissioning process include the following:
. The complexity of CCG structures does not neces-
sarily bring many GPs any closer to the decision-
making process, and it was unclear where particular
decisions would be made. For GPs to bring useful
clinical knowledge, CCGs need to ensure that GPs
understand the wider context, purpose and expected
outcomes of the discussion. There also needs to be
clarity at all levels over decision-making responsibil-
ities. GPs also need to be proactive in asking for
task-speciﬁc brieﬁngs.
. CCGs have enabled the potential involvement of a
greater number of GPs in commissioning processes.
McDermott et al. 9
However, many CCGs are struggling to ensure that
their local GPs feel ownership of the work that is
done in their name.
. To maximize GP added value, it may be appropriate
to reduce GPs’ involvement in some forums depend-
ing on the function of that forum.
. CCGs are an excellent vehicle for engagement across
organizational boundaries throughout the local health
economy. However, the formal architecture of the CCG
and the operation of statutory authority were not neces-
sary. What is required is senior-level representation with
decision-making power from all groups present.
. Mutual dependence between GPs and managers
commonly observed in PBC was also observed in
CCGs. The pertinent diﬀerence is that under PBC,
these supportive relationships were generally limited
to middle managers and the managers involved car-
ried a dual identity, working both for the PBC group
and for the PCT,25 whereas with CCGs, this rela-
tionship can be seen throughout the levels of the
organizations as they are working as part of the
same organization.
Much of what is described under CCGs could have
been achieved using PBC as a vehicle. However, the
scope of activity under CCGs is signiﬁcantly greater
than was the case under PBC (or, indeed, previous clin-
ically led commissioning initiatives), enabling the appli-
cation of GPs’ knowledge to a broader range of service
areas. Our study shows that CCGs do attempt to bring
the knowledge and views of frontline GPs into their
work but this requires explicit attention to processes
and considerable preparatory eﬀort. Online Appendix
summarizes the programme theories and the CMO
which enable the theories to work in practice.
Implications
This study has identiﬁed some of the mechanisms and
conditions which enable CCGs to maximize the ‘added
value’ of involving GPs in the commissioning process.
CCGs face a very challenging future with the ongoing
shift of responsibilities for primary care co-commis-
sioning from NHS England which started in April
2015. This brings with it signiﬁcant challenges for
CCGs, First, CCGs taking on responsibility for com-
missioning primary care services will be eﬀectively com-
missioning themselves, raising issues of conﬂicts of
interest. To address this, CCGs have established pri-
mary care co-commissioning committees which exclude
the majority of GP members. This begins to dilute the
principle under which CCGs were established, of bring-
ing GPs into the centre of commissioning activity.
Second, with all CCGs encouraged to take on full
responsibility for primary care co-commissioning, the
performance management of member practices that
they will be required to undertake could potentially
threaten buy-in and engagement with wider commis-
sioning activity.
Third, there is a growing policy momentum in
favour of a population-based approach, with budgets
pooled across a geographical area. This will require
commissioners, GPs and secondary care provides to
work closely together. Current moves towards the
devolution of responsibilities to geographical areas
bring further complications, with blurring of lines of
accountability and responsibility. These challenges
point to a need for CCGs to be: adaptable and ﬂexible,
alert to the changing environment and deeply engaged
with their colleagues across organizational boundaries.
Co-operative service redesign across a health and care
economy is likely to occupy much managerial and clin-
ical time and eﬀort. Our evidence suggests that maxi-
mizing the value of clinical input into this will require
CCGs to invest time and eﬀort in preparing those
involved, to ensure that they systematically gather evi-
dence about service gaps and problems from their mem-
bers, and to engage members in debate about the future
shape of services. Doing this whilst simultaneously per-
formance managing member practices will be a com-
plex and diﬃcult task.
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